POSIX Permissions

Created by: Peter A. H. Peterson and Dr. Peter Reiher, UCLA {pahp, reiher}@cs.ucla.edu, with Dr. Tanya Crenshaw, UP {crenshaw@up.edu}
Contents
  1. Overview
  2. Required Reading
    1. POSIX Permissions
    2. Criticisms
    3. sudo and Alternatives
    4. Software Tools
      1. adduser, chfn, passwd
      2. addgroup
      3. usermod
      4. chown, chgrp
      5. chmod
  3. Introduction
  4. Assignment Instructions
    1. Setup
      1. Saving your work
      2. Restoring your work
    2. Tasks
      1. Home Directory Security
      2. The Ballot Box
      3. The TPS Reports Directory
      4. sudo Problems
    3. Tips and Tricks
      1. Resolving ambiguities
  5. Submission Instructions

Overview

The purpose of this exercise is to introduce you to filesystem and network access control schemes and the "principle of least privilege" through the use of POSIX filesystem permissions.

After this exercise, you will:

  1. understand the POSIX permissions structure including SUID and SGID bits
  2. understand the essence of the sudo utility and how to configure and use it securely.
  3. be able to apply that knowledge to configure permissions in multiple scenarios, such as:
    1. shared system directories
    2. user home directories and private directories
    3. privileged system directories
    4. unprivileged temporary directories
    5. editing important configuration files
    6. restarting system processes
    7. potential privilege escalation problems

Required Reading

POSIX Permissions

The Portable Operating System Interface, or POSIX, is IEEE standards family IEEE 1003.1 and represents an attempt to formalize the API for variants of the Unix operating system. POSIX specifies standards for the kernel APIs (including many internal functions like permissions, threads, networking, and interprocess communication), commands, required utilities and user-level APIs (including many utilities and scripting tools like awk, echo, ed, sh, vi, basic I/O, and more), and a conformance test that can be run on many platforms. POSIX is very widely disseminated and has been in use for almost 20 years, but is a closed standard (i.e. proprietary). As a result, it is expensive to be certified; this has resulted in many free operating systems such as FreeBSD and Linux being substantially compliant but not officially able to use the moniker "POSIX Compliant". An alternative to POSIX is the Single UNIX Specification, developed by the Austin Group. Unfortunately, it is also proprietary and expensive.

The expense has not been prohibitive for motivated commercial vendors however, and POSIX has been extremely influential in coalescing and standardizing those elements that are characteristically UNIX-like. Furthermore, POSIX is a standard that influences software design and operating system implementations in seemingly unlikely places -- for example, Windows NT and its derivatives (2000, XP, and beyond) can be "POSIX compliant" with the addition of software packages and the enabling of certain features. This broad influence -- existing before the public explosion of the Internet -- has helped to make software and systems similar in fundamental ways. This, in turn, simplifies many portability and interoperability problems.

One of the enduring legacies of Bell Labs UNIX and the POSIX standard are traditional Unix file system permissions, which are a simple system of permissions stored in the file system and and kernel and evaluated to mediate access to system resources. Additionally, since devices are files in Unix, file system permissions also mediate control over many aspects of the operating system.

In most Unix and Unix-like operating systems, the permission system is extremely simple. Each file has read, write, and execute permissions set for each of three groups of users called "access classes". The three classes are user (owner), group, and other; each access class represents one or more users in the following way:

Each access class is encoded by 3 bits. Each bit present grants an additional permission from the set read, write, and execute. When you list files in long form (with the option -l), you will see the permissions written out in the leftmost column as a bitstring with the letters r, w, and x in the order user, group, and other:

Here's what it looks like "in the wild":

$ ls -alh
-rw-r--r--   1 pahp console  18K May 16  2006 gpl.txt
drwx------   5 pahp console  512 May 21  2006 john-1.7.2/
lrwxrwxrwx   1 pahp console   25 Sep 13 20:45 labs -> /proj/some/link/
-rwxr--r--   1 pahp console  171 Sep  9 09:18 loadimage.sh*
drwxrwxrwx   1 pahp console  512 Sep 13 20:45 worldwriteable/
^ ^  ^  ^--- other permissions
| |  '------- group permissions
| '---------- user permissions
'------------ file type: d=directory, l=symbolic link, - means regular file

Here's an example bitstring split into components:

   d     rwx     rwx    rwx
type    user    group  other

In the above example, the owner of the file gpl.txt has read and write permission because the owner part of the bitstring is set to rw-. The owner (pahp) cannot execute this file, but that doesn't matter because it's just a text file. The group class console can read the file, as can the members of the other class -- everyone else.

The directory john-1.7.2 is only accessible by the owner and nobody else. Notice the d in the first place; this means that the file is a directory.

The file labs is a "symbolic link" (sometimes called "soft link") to the directory /proj/some/link/. Symbolic links are a special kind of file that is a pointer to a disk location (a "pathname" which may or may not exist). Permissions on symbolic links do not work as their lrwxrwxrwx permissions might lead you believe.

In addition to the 9 bits required to store the user, group, and other permissions of a file, there are three kinds of "additional permissions" that are rarely used but are extremely important to understand. The additional permissions are known as the setuid bit, setgid bit, and sticky bit. Each special bit has a different function depending on where it is used:

When the the special bits are used on regular files:

When the special bits are used on directories, they have different meanings altogether. Search online to discover what those meanings are on Linux systems.

Every file has permissions of some kind set for the each of the three classes, using the three types of basic permissions: read, write, and execute (and the three special bits). These permissions have a default value (based on the system umask) when the file is created. Permissions can be changed with command line utilities such as chmod and chown, which are discussed later in this document.

These permissions are fairly self explanatory when applied to files, but when applied to directories their meanings are not always intuitive. In particular, permissions set on a directory do not always apply to that directory's contents, and the concepts of "read", "write", and "execute" as they pertain to directories is not obvious. (It helps to think of a directory as a file which contains links to other files, rather than as a nested series of containers -- experiment on SPHERE to determine how they really interact!)

Furthermore, while the special bits are commonly overlooked, they have important meanings with incredible significance in terms of security. You are encouraged to play with these permissions and read other materials in order to fully understand how they are interpreted.

Criticisms

Traditional Unix permissions date back to the early 1970s. While simple and inexpensive to implement and evaluate, they have long been criticized for being out of date and woefully inexpressive compared to the power of other access control systems. Other systems (such as Microsoft Windows and other ACL models for Unix) have more than three access groups, nested groups, explicit deny lists, the ability to specify write permissions for changing, creating, and deleting (with Unix permissions they are largely the same), the ability to consider arbitrary state in evaluating the ACLs (such as time of day, network address, etc.), the ability to make files invisible to unprivileged users, and many other features that traditional Unix permissions lack.

Another important and oft-criticized fact is that Unix permissions do not exactly reflect the current state of the permissions configuration on the system. For example, while Unix checks the file permissions at the moment a file is opened, it only checks those permissions once for each open system call. This means that the permissions are only tested when you first open the file for reading, writing, or executing, not each time you access or modify the file's contents via an open file descriptor. If a user opens a file, and immediately thereafter all permissions on that file for that user are removed, the user with the open file descriptor will still have access to the resource according to the permissions set when the file was opened, even if the current permissions deny reading, writing, or execution.

Furthermore, the traditional Unix permissions and authentication system assigns group membership and other credentials at login time and never checks them again -- this means that system password, login permission, group membership details in /etc/group and other details changed after you log in are not reflected in your processes until you log out and log back in or the process with those credentials is restarted. For example, this means that any change to a user group is fully applied only when all affected processes have been restarted. Another example is that if an attacker steals a password and logs in to a system before that account is disabled or the password is changed, the attacker will still have that level of authentication until he or she logs out.

This is an example of a time-of-check vs. time-of-use (TOCTOU) problem.

These design decisions were made to limit the space occupied by and CPU cycles spent evaluating system permissions. As long as the semantics of the system (including the above criticisms) are fully understood, it can be an effective, acceptably secure solution for many purposes. In fact, in some ways, its simplicity and even naivete make it more transparent and easily understandable when compared to more complex systems. For these and many other reasons, the traditional Unix file permissions are still in wide use, over 40 years after their initial deployment.

sudo and Alternatives

Some applications simply require stronger guarantees, finer granularity, or other features that the traditional permissions cannot express. For those applications, users have many alternatives. sudo is one simple extension to traditional Unix permissions that has become very popular.

sudo is a setuid root application with its own ACL (stored in /etc/sudoers) that specifies, with fine granularity, tasks that users and groups can perform as root. For example, sudo could be used to allow a user to act as root in order to kill processes with a specific name. The user would otherwise have no additional privileges. This is an example of a perfect use for setuid root programs -- granting strongly-constrained privileges to unprivileged users.

However, sudo is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it greatly enhances the expressiveness of Unix permissions without actually changing the permissions system. On the other hand, if improperly configured, it offers easy access to root. For more information on sudo and the sudoers ACL format, please see the manpages for sudo and sudoers (the configuration file), or other sudo-related material online (in particular regarding sudo exploits).

Beyond sudo, two broader and more revolutionary alternatives for Linux permissions include SELinux and grsecurity, while other options exist including LDAP, Novell eDirectory, and other permissions systems for other operating systems. (We won't be using any of these.)

Software Tools

adduser, chfn, passwd: add users to a system

adduser is the tool available for adding users to the system. To create a new user, execute:

$ adduser username

adduser will copy files from the /etc/skel directory to become the new homedir of the new user in the /home/ directory. You can specify a different home directory or automatically add the new user to groups; those options can be found in the adduser manpage.

adduser does not set any finger information for the user (this is not strictly necessary anyway), but the tool chfn will do that:

$ sudo chfn jimbo
Changing finger information for jimbo.
Name []: ...

By default, the user is created with a "locked out" account with no password set. To set the password, use the command passwd:

$ sudo passwd jimbo
Changing password for user jimbo.
New Unix password:
Retype new Unix password:
passwd: all authentication tokens updated successfully.

passwd will complain if it doesn't like the password you enter, but will accept anything with enough prodding.

Once an account is created, you can log into it in a number of ways:

  1. If logged in to the system where you created the account, you can execute ssh newuser@localhost to reconnect locally as the new user with the new password.

  2. If local, you can also use the su command su newuser to change to that user. This does not always update all access credentials, however. This method can also be used to become root by entering sudo su -.

  3. If logged in to your XDC, you can ssh to the node as the new user.

groupadd: add groups to a system

groupadd adds a new group to the system with a unique ID (by default). Example:

$ groupadd newgroup

See man groupadd for more information.

usermod: modify a user

usermod can be used to modify many details of a preexisting user account. For more information, see man usermod.

chown, chgrp: change ownership of a file

chown stands for change ownership and is (unsurprisingly) used to change the owner and group of a file.

The syntax is very simple. To change the owner of a file, execute:

$ chown newowner filename

To change the owner and group classes of a file, execute:

$ chown newowner:newgroup filename

chgrp stands for change group and works very similarly to chown. To change the group of a file, execute:

$ chgrp newgroup filename

Recursive and other options exist; see man chown or man chgrp for more information.

chmod: change the mode of a file

chmod stands for change mode and is used to change the permissions mode of a file. Earlier, we discussed how the POSIX ACL has three access classes. User (or owner), group, and other (or world). The permissions mode for each access class can be changed by the chmod command.

There are two ways to use chmod; one is an absolute numeric mode and the other is a symbolic mode.

chmod: absolute -- setting the permissions explicitly

In the absolute mode, chmod takes a file mode in 3 or 4 digits, each of which represents the absolute permission mode for one access class expressed in octal, where each number is a sum of the permission bits. Each permission has a unique value: read permission is 4, write permission is 2, and execute permission is 1. These values represent the position of the permission in a 3-bit value.

For example, the mode 777 means "full permissions" because all bits are set in each access class. Similarly, 000 means "no permissions" because all bits are unset in each access class.

The 3-digit mode 777 is the equivalent to the 4-digit mode 0777 where the leading 0 represents the "special" permission class of setuid, setgid, and sticky. Likewise, the modes 000 and 0000 are equivalent and represent the absence of permission. (The owner of the file and root still have the ability to change the file's mode by virtue of their ownership and superuser status.) Finally, if the 3-digit mode is used, chmod always assumes that the special access class is 0. Therefore, if you set an suid-root file to mode 777, chmod assumes that you meant mode 0777, which would take away the special permissions. This is consistent if you remember that octal modes represent absolute permissions and the special group class is assumed to be 0 if a 3-digit mode is provided.

The following is a table to help calculate permission modes:

chmod absolute values

special

user

group

other

s

g

t

r

w

x

r

w

x

r

w

x

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

For example, full access is 0777, which represents:

special

user

group

other

s

g

t

r

w

x

r

w

x

r

w

x

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

0

7

7

7

There are no special bits set, so the special octal digit is 0, while all three bits in each other class are set. Each set of bits totals 7 (4 + 2 + 1), so the mode is 0777.

Another example is mode 2755, which represents setgid (2), plus "full access" for user (4 + 2 + 1) and write and execute (4 + 1) access for both the group and other class.

special

user

group

other

s

g

t

r

w

x

r

w

x

r

w

x

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

4

2

1

2

7

5

5

Absolute modes are applied like this:

$ chmod 0755 somefile.sh

Absolute mode is great for setting things to be exactly what you want, or imposing a radically different order onto a file or directory, but it's not very good for adding the sticky bit to a file. For that kind of work (or if the octal modes just confuse you) the symbolic mode is well suited.

chmod: symbolic -- more user-friendly

The symbolic mode works pretty much the way you would expect. To add the execute bit to the user class, you would execute a command like this:

$ chmod u+x somefile.sh

Or to add execute to all three classes:

$ chmod ugo+x somefile.sh

To make a file setuid:

$ chmod u+s somefile.sh

To remove all permissions:

$ chmod ugo-rwxsgt somefile.sh

Some people are so put off by the absolute mode that they never learn it -- you'll find with experience that both methods of setting permissions can be expeditious depending on the situation. More information is available in the chmod manpage.

Regardless of how you set permissions, it is critical that you use the "principle of least privilege" and only grant the privileges that are necessary for proper operation.

Introduction

You are Wilbar Memboob, the Security Administrator of FrobozzCo ("You name it, we make it"). You are looking to hire a new system administrator to replace the guy you just fired -- unfortunately, even though his resume looked great on paper and he interviewed well, once you put him at a console he clearly had no idea what he was doing.

To him, proper permissions meant that the application worked; if it was secure then that was just icing on the cake. You should have done something when the other admins starting calling him "Triple-7" -- a.k.a. "wide open". But it was when he changed the company fileserver directory permissions to "ugo+rwx" and the projected budget was "released" early -- including a list of the employees being laid off -- that he signed his own pink slip.

To keep this from happening again, you've created a little test for your new applicants to take. Unfortunately, before you can grade the applicants, you need to create an answer key.

Assignment Instructions

In the assignment portion of this exercise, you're going to create an answer key for your "hiring exam." You'll need to swap in your nodes and complete the exercises below.

Setup

    1. If you don't have an account, follow the instructions here.

    2. Create an instance of this exercise by following the instructions here, using posix as Lab name. Your topology will look like below:

      .

    3. After setting up the lab, access your posix node.

Changes to SPHERE nodes are lost when the nodes are swapped out. This means that you must manually save your work between working on nodes in order to keep it. However, this exercise includes experimental scripts to help you save and restore your work.

Saving your Work

After completing the POSIX exercises on the posix node, cd into the /root directory and execute the script /root/submit.sh; like this:

$ ./submit.sh

...it will make a tarball of all the relevant files and their permissions, including the /root/permissions-answers.txt file. You must copy or move the created tarball into your group directory, otherwise it will be lost upon swapout.

Restoring Your Work

The experimental script /root/restore.sh on the posix node, takes as input the path to a tarball created by submit.sh described above and restores the files to their proper locations on the system. This includes all the files you are asked to create or change in the first part.

WARNING: These scripts do not back up all arbitrary changes you may have made to the node (e.g., changing a peripheral configuration file), and it does not "merge" system files with submission files -- it only restores submission files copied by submit.sh. You shouldn't need to change anything else, but see submit.sh and restore.sh to see exactly what those scripts do, and do not delete any of your submission tarballs so that you can go back to an earlier version if need be.

To use the restore.sh, copy a tarball created by submit.sh into the /root/ directory and execute this command:

$ ./restore.sh username-permissions-123123123.tar.gz

You will be asked if you want to automatically overwrite files, and if you want to selectively restore some files and not others. The options are self-explanatory.

Finally, if you don't trust the scripts, you can always make your own backups into your group directory and restore them by hand if you prefer.

NOTE: You do not need to run the submit and restore scripts with sudo. However, if you use sudo to run submit.sh, your tarball will be named after the root user. This is OK -- just run sudo ./restore.sh root-permissions-2134234243.tar.gz.

Tasks

Your task is to create an answer key for the following test:

FrobozzCo Permissions

This test is a part of the application process for the administrator position at FrobozzCo. You will be presented with a number of tasks and questions; the tasks must be executed on the posix node of the SPHERE experiment we have created for this purpose (you can use the client node for testing), while the questions must be answered in a plain text file that will be submitted with the results of your tasks. See below for further instructions.

Part 1: POSIX File Permissions and 'sudo'

Instructions

The following section includes a number of permissions and file creation exercises. This test will be performed on a live network testbed with a full complement of standard utilities and editors. In addition, you are fully encouraged to use the Internet, man pages, help screens, and any other resources available to you in the execution and answering of these problems.

Please read and use these disambiguation rules for setting the correct permissions. Also, make sure that you test your answers -- POSIX permissions are simple in theory, but in practice many combinations have counterintuitive effects!

Your answers will consist of an archive, created by the submit.sh script described above. The archive will contain:

  1. A copy of your permissions modifications. You will be graded only on the correctness of your answers, not their elegance nor how efficiently you came to them.
  2. Your written answers to the numbered short answer questions. These should be written in the file /root/permissions-answers.txt on the server system using an editor (such as vim).

See below for instructions on submitting your answers.

Home Directory Security

Note: Admins -- members of the wheel group have sudo access. However, unless instructed to do so, use only standard UNIX ACLs -- don't give user accounts sudo permissions or consider the sudo access the 'wheel' group already has. Of course, you need to use sudo to create the accounts, edit root files, etc... this is exactly what sudo is for.

Your server needs two home directories. Important: We will not be using the /home directory for the users in this lab. Instead, you will be using /emp and also /admins for your team. Normal home directories are private, while the homedirectories in  /admins will be publicly viewable and somewhat collaborative.

You can test the permissions settings on posix by logging in as the various accounts you've created! For example, after creating the account larry, you can log in by executing ssh larry@localhost and entering the password you used for larry. In this way, you can see if the permissions you set meet the requirements.

  1. Create the /admins and /emp directories.

  2. Create the groups emp and wheel (see man groupadd).

  3. Create the normal (i.e., non-admin) user accounts larry, moe, and curly using adduser. You may set the passwords to anything you like.

  4. Add the non-admin accounts to the emp group by editing /etc/group or using usermod.

  5. Create the admin user accounts ken, dmr, and bwk -- specifying that the home directory for each admin should be located at /admins/username -- where username is ken, dmr or bwk. In other words, admin homedirs are not in /emp. (See man adduser for special homedirectory options.) You may set the passwords to anything you like.

  6. Add the admin accounts to the wheel group by editing /etc/group or using usermod. (Ensure that admins are not part of the emp group.)

  7. add larry, bwk, and dmr to ken's group.
  8. add moe, dmr, and ken to bwk's group.
  9. add curly, ken, and bwk to dmr's group.
  10. On this system, default permissions for new home directories allow other users (i.e., users that are not the owner or in the specified group) to read and execute files in the directory. This is too permissive for us. Set the mode on the home directories in /emp so that owner can read, write, and execute, group can read and execute and other has no permissions. (Set the mode on the homedir only -- do not set it recursively.)

  11. Individual home directories should now be inaccessible to other users. Now, set the permission mode on /emp itself so that normal users can't list the contents of /emp but can still access their home directories and so that members of the wheel group have full access to the directory (without using sudo).

  12. By default, each homedir is owned by its user, and the homedir's group is set to the group named after the user. (For example, ken's homedir is set to ken:ken -- i.e., ken is the owner and the group is set to ken's group.) Set the permission modes recursively on the individual homedirectories in /admins (see man chmod) so that:

    • owners have full access

    • group users (users who are in the group associated with a user's home directory) can read and create files in that homedir
    • other users can read and execute any files (unlike the home directories in /emp)
    • files created by a group member in that homedir should be set to the homedir owner's group. (Hint: Look up what the SUID and SGID bits do on directories.)
    • Example: larry is in ken's group. larry can create files in ken's homedir, and those files are owned by larry, but are assigned to ken's group rather than larry's group. moe, not in ken's group, can only read and execute files. (Note that permissions for normal emp user homedirs are not changed.)

The Ballot Box

All regular employees use this directory to submit votes for "employee of the month".

  1. Create the /ballots directory.

  2. Set the permissions on /ballots so that it is owned by root and users can write files into the directory but cannot list the contents of the directory.

  3. Furthermore, set it so that members of the wheel group have no access (not including sudo).

  4. Short Answer 1: Is there any way that employees can read the ballots of other users? If so, what could be done to stop this? If not, what prevents them from reading them?

  5. Short Answer 2: What does the 'x' bit mean when applied to directories?

The TPS Reports Directory

Admin employees submit TPS reports in this partially collaborative directory.

  1. Create the /tpsreports directory.

  2. Create the tps user.

  3. Set the permissions on /tpsreports so that it is owned by tps and that tps and members of the wheel group have full access to the directory, but so that no one else has access to the directory.

  4. Furthermore, configure it so that files written into it are still owned by the wheel group, but so that one member of wheel cannot delete another member's files.

  5. Short Answer 3: Which users on the system can delete arbitrary files in the /tpsreports directory?

  6. Short Answer 4: Is there any way that non-wheel employees can read files in the /tpsreports directory?

  7. Short Answer 5: What do '0' permissions mean for the owner of a directory? What privileges do they have over files in that directory?

sudo: Editing Configuration Files

For the following three short answer questions, assume that your answers are unrelated; that is, your answer for question 6 does not impact the answer for questions 7 or 8.

All members of the wheel group do system administration on the server. Because of this, they all have full sudo access to root privilege with the /etc/sudoers directive '%wheel ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL'. The "NOPASSWD" means they don't have to enter a passwd upon sudo invocation.

The employee larry is the webmaster for the system, so he has some extra privilege compared to the other employees. For example, larry has sudo access to the command

/usr/bin/vim /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf 

... with the directive

larry ALL=(ALL) /usr/bin/vim /etc/httpd/confs/httpd.conf

... so that he can update the configuration of the webserver.

Short Answer 6: Is this safe? Why or why not? If it is not safe, is there a better way to give larry this access? If it is safe, how do you know it is safe? (Hint: search online for common sudo issues.)

sudo: Restarting System Processes

As a part of his webmaster duties, larry often requests the wheel group to restart the Apache server with the command '/etc/init.d/httpd restart'. It would make everyone very happy if there was a secure way to let larry restart the Apache server (but not give him any other access).

Short Answer 7: Assuming the init script /etc/init.d/httpd has no unknown vulnerabilities, is it safe to grant larry sudo access to the command /etc/init.d/httpd restart? If this is not secure, explain why.

POSIX and sudo: Two Wrongs Make a Much Bigger Wrong

Carefully examine the permissions on the server. Look at /etc/group, /etc/sudoers, and the files in the /admins and /home directories (and their subdirectories).

Short Answer 8: Is there some way that moe or curly could subvert this system to gain root privileges? If not, how do you know this is true?

Hint: Consider what happens during the UNIX login process -- the time between when the user enters the correct password and when they can interact with their shell.

Tips and Tricks

This section includes important rules and tips for making sure that your answers are correct.

1. Rules for resolving filesystem permission ambiguities:

Permissions should always be set to reflect the least privilege required to fulfill the requirements. In POSIX permissions, every bit set represents less security, so we want to set as few bits as possible. Resolve any ambiguities with this cumulative list of guidelines:

  1. Files you are instructed to create are to be owned by root unless otherwise specified. Doing the work as root should do this automatically. (You can become root by executing sudo su -.)

    • Exception: Files in homedirs should be owned by the homedir owner (useradd should do this by default for boilerplate files like .bash_login, etc).
  2. When setting ownership of a file, set the group class to the same thing as the user (owner) class unless otherwise specified.
    • Example: Create the directory foo. Set www-data as the owner of foo.

    • Answer: Set www-data to be the user (owner) and group class of foo.

    • Example: Create the directory xyzzy. Set the group class to www-data.

    • Answer: Set the group class to www-data but the user class should still be set to root.

  3. Files whose permissions you are not otherwise instructed to change should stay at their default.

    • Example: Create directory baz. Create directory quux and set its permissions to be wide open.

    • Answer: Don't change baz's file mode. It should be owned by root (as per #1). Set quux permissions to 0777.

  4. For any files whose permissions you are instructed to change, unspecified permissions are always assumed to be 0 (no access). In other words, instructions for setting file permissions implicitly include all access groups (even those not explicitly mentioned).

    • Example: Set directory foo so that its owner has full access.

    • Answer: The correct mode is 0700, since no group or other permissions were specified and we assume that they are 0.

  5. Permissions are assumed to be for all classes unless specified.
    • Example: Remove all permissions from /dev/hdc.

    • Answer: Set /dev/hdc to mode 000 (root still has access of course).

    • Example: Set read and write permissions on /etc/motd.

    • Answer: /etc/motd should be set to mode 0666 -- all classes can read and write.

  6. When granting permissions, setuid, setgid, and sticky bits are never granted unless specifically required to solve the problem. These bits are special and must be required by the nature of the question or be otherwise mentioned to be granted.

    • Example: Set a directory so that owner has full access and it's group class members can create files in it.
    • Answer: The correct mode is 0730 because a user (in this case the group user) requires both write and execute to create files. The question didn't specify anything requiring setuid or setgid so they are not enabled.

    • Note: the other class in this example has no access because the permission is assumed to be 0 (as per #4).

    • Note: In #3 above, see that "wide open" for the directory quux meant 0777 not 4777 because setuid was not specified or required.

  7. If any tasks are not possible with the standard POSIX permissions available in this exercise, explain why.

Submission Instructions

Submit a tarball created by submit.sh to your instructor. You must use a tarball created by this script so that it will correctly save the permissions of the directories.